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I. Introduction 
Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience
1 is a tour de force: inspired by his work with Nuel Belnap on 
the revision theory of truth, Gupta presents a brilliant new approach to perceptual justification that aims to 
embrace  the  epistemic  interdependence  of  our  perceptual  judgments  and  background  beliefs  without 
succumbing to skepticism. Gupta sees his project as a continuation of the empiricist tradition, and his 
overarching goal is to preserve the genuine insights that can be found in  classical empiricism  while 
avoiding  the  assumptions  that  force  most  classical  empiricists  to  renounce  (or  at  least  radically 
reinterpret) our commonsense view of the world. There is much to be admired in Gupta’s book: several 
elements in his theory are strikingly original, his use of technical machinery to achieve epistemological 
results is masterful, and his critical discussions of Quine, Sellars, Davidson, and others are sharp and 
incisive. 
In these comments I focus on the two portions of Gupta’s book that I find the most exciting: his 
claim that individual experiences yield only conditional entitlements to form beliefs, and his claim that 
nonetheless certain sequences of experiences can together give us absolute entitlements to form beliefs. In 
the next two sections, I lay out these parts of Gupta’s view. Then, in the three sections that follow, I 
mention three reservations that I have about whether these two ideas of Gupta’s can do all of the work 
that  he  wants  them  to  do.  Although,  as  is  inevitable  in  a  book  symposium  of  this  sort,  I  will  be 
highlighting several features of Gupta’s project that I find problematic or in need of further refinement, 
my primary goal in these comments is to convince you that Gupta’s book is worth carefully studying. 
Even if Gupta’s proposal does not—at least in its current form—succeed in its lofty ambitions, I think 
there is no denying that Gupta has put forward a significant new contribution to the epistemology of 
                                                         
1   Gupta  2006a.  All  page  references  in  the  text  are  to  this  book,  unless  otherwise  noted.  (For  those  seeking  a  shorter 
introduction to Gupta’s main ideas, Gupta 2006b essentially serves as a précis of the full-length book.)   2 
perception whose main components—taking perceptual justification to be conditional, using convergence 
in  light  of  experience  to  get  absolute  entitlements,  ruling  out  skeptical  scenarios  because  of  their 
dynamical properties—are deserving of further scrutiny. 
II. Gupta on the Given: Hypothetical Entitlements 
When I open my eyes and look out on the room before me, I have a certain visual experience. I also form 
certain perceptual judgments on the basis of that experience. Let us assume that at least some of these 
perceptual beliefs are rational—or in other words, that I am entitled to believe at least some of them, that 
at least some of them are justified. (Following Gupta, I will be taking these three ways of talking about 
the normative status of beliefs as being roughly synonymous.) Which of my various perceptual judgments 
are rational, and in virtue of what are they rational? In particular, what is the specific contribution of my 
experience to the rationality of my perceptual beliefs? This is Gupta’s guiding question.
2 
  One perennially attractive answer is that my experience determines a certain class of propositions, 
and  I  am  entitled  to  believe  any  proposition  in  that  class.  On  this  theory,  which  Gupta  calls  the 
propositional  given,  the  nature  of  my  perceptual  experience  completely  fixes  the  propositions  I  am 
justified in believing on its basis; thus whatever background beliefs I might have (about the lighting 
conditions in the room, about the reliability of my perceptual faculties, about the nature of perceptual 
experience  itself)  are  entirely  irrelevant  to  the  justification  which  my  experience  confers  on  the 
propositions in that privileged class. In particular, this means that anyone in any possible circumstances 
with the exact same experience that I am having would be justified in believing the exact same privileged 
class of propositions.
3 So according to the advocate of the propositional given, the following holds: 
                                                         
2  Actually, Gupta begins his book by asking a  slightly different question, namely  “What  is the rational  contribution of 
experience to knowledge?” He quickly slides into asking, “What is the contribution of experience to the rationality of belief?” 
and most of what he says in the book directly addresses this latter question. However, in light of the sorts of issues raised by the 
Gettier literature, it should be clear that an account of experience’s contribution to the rationality of belief is not yet an account of 
experience’s contribution to knowledge, since (if our intuitive judgments on the matter are to be trusted) rational true belief can 
fail  to  be  knowledge.  (Still,  on  the  assumption  that  knowledge  requires  rational/justified/entitled  belief,  an  account  of  the 
contribution of experience to rational belief is plausibly an important first step in an account of the contribution of experience to 
knowledge.) 
3   I am assuming here that if fact F2 obtains in virtue of fact F1 in one possible situation, then in every possible situation in 
which fact F1 obtains,  fact F2 also obtains. Although this  conditional  is explicitly denied by moral particularists, it will be 
harmless to assume it in our present discussion.   3 
the propositional given:  If subject S has experience e, then S is entitled to believe a certain class 
of propositions, Γe. 
Different versions of this theory will specify the class Γe, which Gupta calls “the given in experience,” in 
different ways. On one version (which we might call the ordinary propositional given), when I have an 
experience as of seeing a man wearing a green tie, I am entitled to believe the following: “That man is 
wearing a green tie.” On another version (which we might call the sense-datum propositional given), 
when I have the same experience, I am instead entitled to believe the following: “That man-shaped visual 
sense-datum bears such-and-such spatial relation to that tie-shaped green sense-datum.” And so on. 
  In chapter 2 of Empiricism and Experience, Gupta argues that a commitment to the propositional 
given has untenable consequences. His basic argument has two parts: first (§2C) he argues that, given 
certain plausible constraints on any account of experience, an advocate of the propositional given must 
accept a Cartesian conception of experience according to which all of the propositions in Γe advert to 
sense-data (e.g. “A green sense-datum is before me”), or to adverbial appearance statements (e.g. “I am 
being appeared to greenly”), or in some other way to how things seem or appear to the subject; then (§2D) 
he argues that such Cartesian conceptions of experience inexorably lead to either skepticism or idealism. 
Although I think there are multiple places  where a  fan of the propositional given can resist Gupta’s 
argument—so  that  acceptance  of  the  propositional  given  does  not  make  a  Cartesian  conception  of 
experience and its concomitant tendency toward skepticism or idealism “inevitable,” as Gupta sometimes 
puts it (pp. vii, 75, 161)—discussing the details of Gupta’s argument against the propositional given 
would take us too far adrift.
4 Moreover, I think Gupta is undoubtably correct that those who embrace the 
                                                         
4   The first half of Gupta’s argument against the propositional given relies on the following three premises (among others): 
Propositional Equivalence:  For all possible experiences e and e′, if e and e′ are subjectively identical, then Γe = Γe′. 
Propositional Reliability:  For any possible experience e, if e occurs and P ∈ Γe, then P is not false. 
Weak Existential Assumption:  For any possible experience e, there exists a possible experience e′ such that (i) e and e′ 
are subjectively identical, and (ii) e′ is a dream experience, or a hallucination, or some other experience in 
which the subject is not in touch with an external world of mind-independent objects. 
However, some propositional givenists (see, for example, McDowell 2008 and Williamson 2000, ch. 8) will deny Propositional 
Equivalence, other propositional givenists (see, for example, Audi 2003 and Pryor 2000) will deny Propositional Reliability, and 
still other propositional givenists (see, for example, Neta 2009) will deny the Weak Existential Assumption. 
    (Gupta claims [p. 32, n. 27] that one can run a variant of his argument which does not appeal to Propositional Reliability, 
but I find this version of the argument much less convincing, especially once one realizes that entitlements are permissions, not 
obligations: see the end of §VI below.)   4 
propositional  given  face  significant  pressure  toward  embracing  skepticism  or  idealism  as  well.  This 
pressure, as well as the host of other problems that bedevil propositional accounts of the given,
5 make it 
well worth seeing, in my opinion, whether a viable non-propositional account of the given can be found. 
  According  to  the  propositional  givenist,  experiences  give  rise  to  absolute,  unqualified 
entitlements: if I have a certain experience, then I am entitled (full stop) to believe various propositions on 
the basis of that experience. Gupta’s proposal, on the other hand, is that experiences give rise to merely 
conditional entitlements. Following Gupta, let us define a person’s view to be the totality of that person’s 
concepts, conceptions, and beliefs (p. 76). Consider the view that I currently hold: it includes certain 
concepts such as <tie> and <person>, certain conceptions such as that of a philosophy conference and that 
of a book symposium, and certain beliefs such as that I live in an external world of mind-independent 
objects, that my eyes are functioning properly, that the lighting around me is normal, and so on. Now 
suppose I have an experience as of seeing a man before me wearing a green tie. Then Gupta’s claim is 
that if I am entitled to hold my view, then I am entitled to believe that there is a man before me wearing a 
green tie (ibid.). Contrast this with a slightly different case in which my view is basically the same as it is 
now, except that instead of believing that my eyes are functioning properly, I believe that the epilepsy 
medicine I’ve been taking has tinged my eye lenses yellow so that things which look green to me are 
actually blue.
6 If I have the same experience as of seeing a man before me wearing a green tie, Gupta 
thinks that now a slightly different conditional holds: if I am entitled to hold my tinged-eye-lenses view, 
then I am entitled to believe that there is a man before me wearing a blue tie (p. 77). Finally, consider a 
more fanciful case. Suppose I hold a solipsist view according to which all that exists is my mind and its 
sense-data, and everything else that exists is a logical construction out of those sense-data. If I have the 
same experience, Gupta thinks the following conditional holds: if I am entitled to hold my solipsist view, 
then I am entitled to believe that I sense a man-shaped visual sense-datum and a tie-shaped green sense-
datum which are spatially related to each other in such-and-such a manner (pp. 77-78). 
                                                         
5   I am thinking here, in particular, of the bootstrapping worries that exist for most non-Cartesian versions of the propositional 
given: see Cohen 2002 and White 2006. 
6    It has been speculated that Vincent Van Gogh’s epilepsy medicine gave him the medical condition known as yellow 
vision, which would explain the preponderance of yellow shades in his paintings.   5 
  Thus  Gupta  holds  that  individual  experiences  only  furnish  us  with  hypothetical  entitlements: 
assuming that one is entitled to bring a certain view to bear on a given experience, then one is entitled to 
believe certain propositions on the basis of that experience. As before, we can summarize this position by 
isolating a class of propositions that constitute the experiential given for a subject at a time. However, 
whereas according to the propositional givenist which propositions are in that class is only a function of 
the experience that one is currently having, according to Gupta the propositions in that class are a function 
of both one’s experience and one’s (entitlement to a) view.
7 In other words, Gupta holds: 
the hypothetical given:  If subject S has experience e and is entitled to hold view v, then S is 
entitled to believe a certain class of propositions, Γe(v). 
In the language of justification: if S has experience e and is justified in holding view v, then S is justified 
in believing each member of Γe(v). In the language of rationality: if S has experience e and it is rational 
for S to hold view v, then it is rational for S to believe each member of Γe(v). 
  The idea that the given is hypothetical in character is the heart of Gupta’s account of perceptual 
justification. Before turning to the other crucial element in that account, I want to warn against a certain 
misinterpretation  of  Gupta  that  is  tempting  at  this  point.  Gupta  often  summarizes  his  idea  of  the 
hypothetical given by saying things such as the following: “Once I bring this view to my experience, I am 
entitled to certain perceptual judgments”; “Considered under this view, the experience entitles me [to 
certain perceptual judgments]”; “When I conjoin my experience with the Cartesian view, I am entitled to 
[certain] perceptual judgments” (pp. 77-78, emphasis mine). These ways of speaking makes it natural to 
suppose that Gupta’s account of the given is actually as follows: 
the hypothetical given (alternate version):  If subject S has experience e and holds view v, then S 
is entitled to believe a certain class of propositions, Γe(v). 
However, I believe that a careful reading of Gupta’s text makes it clear that my first formulation of the 
                                                         
7   Gupta often insists that what is unique about his view is that he takes the given in experience to be a function, whereas the 
propositional givenist takes it to be a class of propositions (see p. 79). However, I think this way of characterizing the difference 
between Gupta and the propositional givenist is misleading. On both accounts the given is  a function: for the propositional 
givenist it  is  a one-argument function  from  experiences to  classes of propositions, whereas  for Gupta  it  is a  two-argument 
function from experiences and views to classes of propositions. Of course, once we fix on a particular experience, then according 
to the propositional givenist the given-for-that-experience is a class of propositions. But so too, once we fix on a particular 
experience and a particular view, then according to Gupta the given-for-that-experience-and-that-view is a class of propositions.   6 
hypothetical given is in fact the one he intends.
8 Moreover, this alternate version of the hypothetical given 
is extremely implausible: it would imply, for example, that even if I hold a solipsist view for completely 
zany reasons, as long as I hold fast to that view, every experience I have entitles me to believe in the 
existence of sense-data. So it is important to bear in mind that Gupta’s talk of, say, conjoining a view with 
an experience should be read as talk of conjoining a view-to-which-one-is-entitled with an experience. 
Similarly, Gupta often schematically represents his proposal as follows (p. 77; see also Gupta 2006b, 
p. 189): 
View  +  Experience  ⇒  Perceptual Judgments 
However,  I think this way of putting things is slightly misleading. A more faithful representation of 
Gupta’s proposal would be as follows: 
Entitlement to View  +  Experience  ⇒  Entitlement to Perceptual Judgments 
It is entitlements to views (not views by themselves) which together with experiences yield entitlements to 
perceptual judgments (not perceptual judgments by themselves). This issue will become important during 
my second set of critical comments, in §V below. 
III. Gupta on Convergence: From Hypothetical to Categorical Entitlements 
Gupta’s account of the given is weaker, and hence more defensible, than the account provided by the 
propositional  givenist.  Surely,  Gupta  insists,  everyone  will  concede  that  if  I  am  entitled  to  my 
commonsense view of the world, then my visual experience as of a man wearing a green tie entitles me to 
believe that there is a man wearing a green tie before me. However, Gupta’s account of the given also 
raises a problem: what explains why I am entitled to my commonsense view of the world (if indeed I 
am)? Presumably my commonsense view is at least partially justified by other perceptual experiences that 
I have had in the past. But this leads to the following predicament (pp. 76-77, 162, 215): 
                                                         
8   Some choice quotations that tell in favor of my interpretation: “...assuming that I am justified in my view, I am justified in 
my perceptual judgments” (p. 76); “...given that I have the experience and given that I am entitled to my view, it follows that I 
am entitled to my perceptual judgments” (ibid.); “...provided that the view that we bring to bear on experience is rational, the 
resulting perceptual judgments are rational” (p. 163); “...[experience] delivers rational judgments only when it has the aid of a 
rational view” (p. 164); “...the rationality of our perceptual judgments depends in turn upon the rationality of our view” (p. 215). 
See also Gupta 2009, where Gupta explicitly rejects the second interpretation of the hypothetical given (p. 339-340) and then 
explicitly endorses what appears to be the first interpretation: “Experience does not, by itself, entitle us to affirm perceptual 
judgments; it only does so in conjunction with an antecedent rational view (or a specific rational part of a view)” (p. 340).   7 
the  epistemic  interdependence  of  views  and  perceptual  judgments:    Our  entitlement  to  our 
perceptual judgments depends on our entitlement to our views, and our entitlement to our 
views depends on our entitlement to our perceptual judgments. 
How to break out of this chain of epistemic dependencies is not easy to see.
9 
  It is here that Gupta’s work with Belnap on the revision theory of truth comes to the fore.
10 The 
basic idea behind the revision theory of truth is that circularity/interdependence is a phenomenon that is to 
be exploited, not feared. The interdependence in question in that theory is definitional interdependence: in 
The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap first show how it is possible to extract from a set of 
circular definitions information about the extensions of the concepts defined in terms of those definitions, 
then argue that the concept of truth is in fact a circular concept of just that sort, and finally use the 
information that they extract about the extension of the concept <true> to propose a solution to the liar 
paradox and a host of other puzzles that plague most attempts to sketch a formal theory of truth. Now the 
interdependence that threatens Gupta’s account of perceptual justification is epistemic interdependence, 
not definitional interdependence, so a straightforward application of his ideas from the revision theory of 
truth is not possible: what is worrisome for Gupta’s account of perceptual justification is not that our 
definition  of  a  view  is  intertwined  with  our  definition  of  a  perceptual  judgment,  but  rather  that  our 
justification for our views is intertwined with our justification for our perceptual judgments. Nonetheless, 
Gupta’s idea for how to break free from the epistemic interdependence of views and perceptual judgments 
is  very  much  inspired  by  the  formal  machinery  that  he  and  Belnap  developed  when  investigating 
interdependent definitions as part of their revision theory of truth. 
  Gupta proposes the following model for how hypothetical perceptual entitlements could yield 
categorical entitlements.
11 Imagine an ideally rational being who initially holds a view v0 and undergoes a 
                                                         
9   An approach to this problem that Gupta does not consider is to have our entitlement to our views partially depend on our 
entitlement to our perceptual judgments, but also partially depend on some other source of entitlements that is wholly categorical 
in nature. One proposal along these lines that is still vaguely empiricist in spirit would involve taking us to have a small pool of 
innate knowledge (and hence non-conditionally justified beliefs) about extremely general features of the world and our epistemic 
relationship to it, which together with the conditional justification we receive via experience might be enough to erect an edifice 
of knowledge that includes most of our commonsense beliefs. 
10   See Gupta 1988-89 and Gupta & Belnap 1993. A brief summary of the essentials of the revision theory of truth can be 
found in ch. 3 of Empiricism and Experience. 
11   This model is of course idealized in many ways. Gupta attempts to remove some of these idealizations in ch. 7.   8 
sequence of experiences E = <e1, e2, e3, ... en>.
12 At the first stage of this process, our rational being brings 
view v0 to bear on experience e1 and revises it in light of the perceptual judgments Γe1(v0) entailed by e1. 
Sometimes this is achieved simply by adding the judgments in Γe1(v0) to v0. But other times, Gupta tells us 
(p. 81), the pressure from Γe1(v0) necessitates a substantial revision of the original view v0. In general, let  
ρe(v) = the result of rationally revising view v in light of the perceptual judgments Γe(v) entailed 
by experience e.
13 
(For now let us assume that there is always a unique way of rationally revising a given view in light of the 
perceptual  judgments  entailed  by  a  given  experience;  near  the  end  of  §VI  we  shall  revisit  this 
assumption.) Then we can summarize the first stage as follows: our rational being starts out with view v0, 
undergoes experience e1, and as a result revises her view to view v1 = ρe1(v0). 
  At the second stage of our process, the rational being brings view v1 to bear on experience e2 and 
revises it in light of the perceptual judgments Γe2(v1) entailed by e2. This results in a new view, v2 = ρe2(v1) 
= ρe2(ρe1(v0)). At the third stage, our rational being brings view v2 to bear on experience e3 and revises it in 
light of that experience to view v3 = ρe3(v2) = ρe3(ρe2(v1)) = ρe3(ρe2(ρe1(v0))). And so on: at each successive 
stage  in  the  process,  the  rational  being  revises  her  current  view  in  light  of  the  experience  that  she 
undergoes at that stage. Let V = <v0, v1, v2, v3, ... > = <v0, ρe1(v0), ρe2(ρe1(v0)), ρe3(ρe2(ρe1(v0))), ... > be the 
sequence of views that the rational being holds during this process. Gupta calls V the revision sequence 
generated by E and v0. In general, if E = <e1, e2, e3, ... en> is a finite sequence of experiences, let 
ρE(v) = ρen(ρen-1(ρen-2(...ρe3(ρe2(ρe1(v)))...))). 
Since ρE(v0) is the final view in the revision sequence V generated by E and v0, let us call ρE(v0) the 
outcome of the revision sequence generated by  E and v0. (This last piece of formalism is mine, not 
Gupta’s.) Intuitively, ρE(v0) is the view that results when a rational being starts with initial view v0 and 
revises it in light of each of the successive experiences in E. 
                                                         
12   In Empiricism and Experience, Gupta starts by considering the case in which our rational being undergoes a denumerably 
infinite sequence of experiences (pp. 88-101), and then later extends his formalism to the finite case (pp. 101-102). Here I follow 
Gupta 2006b in considering the finite case from the beginning, since—as far as I can see—there is no need to take a detour 
through the infinite case in order to explain Gupta’s basic account of categorical entitlements. 
13   In Empiricism and Experience Gupta calls this function R(v, e) (see p. 88), whereas in Gupta 2006b he calls it ρe(v) (see 
p. 195 of that article). Since I find the ρe(v) notation more perspicuous, especially when the function is embedded multiple times, 
I have chosen to adopt that notation here.   9 
  Notice that two rational beings who start with different views but undergo the same sequence of 
experiences can converge on essentially the same view when they update their views in light of those 
experiences. For example, consider the two views that I mentioned earlier: 
v* = the commonsense view that I actually hold right now; 
v** = a view just like v*, except it contains the belief that the epilepsy medicine I’ve been taking 
has tinged my eye lenses yellow so that things which look green to me are actually 
blue (as well as whatever other changes are needed to make the view moderately 
coherent). 
Consider a sequence of experiences in which I first undergo an experience as of seeing a man wearing a 
green tie, and then later undergo an experience as of having an optometrist test my vision with color 
charts, an experience as of that optometrist telling me that my color vision is completely normal, an 
experience as of someone else explaining to me that epilepsy medicine doesn’t actually tinge one’s eye 
lenses yellow, and so on. If I start by accepting v**, then after the first experience in that sequence, it will 
be  rational  for  me  to  believe  that  sometime  today  there  was  a  man  before  me  wearing  a  blue  tie. 
However, after I undergo the entire sequence of experiences, it will be rational for me to revise my belief 
so that instead I believe that sometime today there was a man before me wearing a green tie. And of 
course I would have had that belief all along if I had started by holding view v*. So regardless of whether 
I start with view v* or view v**, the rational pressure of experience will cause me to converge on the 
same belief. Gupta sees this mechanism of converge in light of experience as the secret to extracting 
absolute entitlements from merely conditional ones. 
  Let us say that a view is admissible if and only if it is an acceptable starting point for a process of 
revision. For a given finite sequence of experiences E, let us define a set of propositions as follows: 
ΩE = {P : (∀ admissible view v)(P ∈ ρE(v))}. 
Thus  ΩE  is  the  set  of  all  propositions  that  are  contained  in  every  outcome  generated  by  E  and  an 
admissible view. For this reason, let us call ΩE the common core of the admissible outcomes generated by 
E. (This is another piece of formalism that is mine, not Gupta’s.) Then Gupta’s proposal is as follows: 
the categorical given:  If subject S has had sequence of experiences E, then S is entitled to believe 
any proposition P such that P ∈ ΩE.   10 
When the rational development, in light of experience, of every acceptable starting view agrees on a given 
proposition, one is absolutely (not just conditionally) justified in believing that proposition. Or so, at least, 
Gupta claims.
14 
  Why the restriction to admissible views? Why not instead allow any arbitrary initial starting view 
when defining ΩE? The problem, according to Gupta, is that doing so would block the possibility of our 
ever having absolute justification to believe ordinary claims about the world such as that there is a man 
before me wearing a green tie. Gupta insists that if vs is a solipsist view, then there is no finite sequence 
of experiences E such that ρE(vs) is a commonsense view according to which we live in an ordinary world 
of mind-independent objects. So if solipsist views are allowed as acceptable starting points for revision, it 
follows that for any finite sequence of experiences E, there is always at least one admissible outcome 
generated by E that is not a commonsense view. And this in turn means that ΩE, the intersection of all the 
admissible outcomes generated by E, can never contain commonsense propositions such as that there is 
man before  me wearing a green tie.  Gupta concludes that if  we  want to hold out hope that  we are 
absolutely entitled to believe such propositions, we need to rule out solipsist views from being acceptable 
starting points for the process of revision. 
  Following Gupta, let us say that view v is fundamentally equivalent to view v′ if and only if v and 
v′ offer the same basic account of the self and the world (p. 91). Let us also say that view v is rigid if and 
only if, for any possible finite sequence of experiences E, ρE(v) is fundamentally equivalent to v (p. 154, 
n. 57). Then Gupta proposes the following restriction on admissible views (pp. 154-155): 
Gupta’s criterion:  A view is admissible only if it is not rigid. 
Rigid views are barred by Gupta from being acceptable starting points for revision because their basic 
picture of the world and the self is completely impervious to experience: no matter what experiences we 
might have, the essential details of that picture do not shift as we revise our beliefs in light of experience. 
                                                         
14   Gupta’s official presentation of the categorical given involves defining a number of notions (virtual identity, convergent 
revision processes, surviving views, etc.) that I have not mentioned here. However, there is no need to introduce these concepts in 
order to present Gupta’s main proposal about what makes a rational being categorically justified in believing a given proposition, 
as the following quotation makes clear: “...at any stage n, the [rational being] has an absolute obligation to accept all that is 
common to the views ... that survive at stage n” (p. 98). See also Gupta 2006b, p. 198, n. 26.   11 
It is this restriction that allows Gupta to solve the problem presented by solipsist views, for Gupta insists 
that solipsist views are rigid and hence inadmissible. Moreover, the familiar skeptical hypotheses are 
disarmed  in  a  similar  way:  according  to  Gupta,  brain-in-a-vat  views  and  deceived-by-an-evil-demon 
views are also rigid and for this reason unacceptable starting points for revision (p. 175; see also Gupta 
2006b, p. 202). This provides Gupta with a novel way of avoiding the epistemic threat presented by 
skeptical hypotheses: skeptical hypotheses are deemed unacceptable, at least as initial starting points, 
because of the very property that makes them so epistemologically terrifying, namely their immunity to 
refutation through experience (p. 157). For Gupta, it is the dynamical behavior of skeptical hypotheses 
under possible streams of experience that renders them inadmissible (p. 159). 
This  concludes  my  summary  of  Gupta’s  account  of  perceptual  justification.  To  recap,  the 
essential details of his account are these: 
i.  Individual experiences give rise to merely conditional entitlements to believe: if one is entitled to 
hold view v, then experience e entitles one to believe a certain class of propositions, Γe(v). 
ii.  Sequences of experiences can give rise to absolute entitlements to believe if the following holds: 
every way of starting with an admissible view and then successively revising it in light of the 
propositions entailed by the experiences in that sequence results in a view that agrees on a given 
proposition. 
iii.  Solipsist views, brain-in-a-vat views, deceived-by-an-evil-demon views, and the like are deemed 
inadmissible because they have the dynamical property of being rigid: no course of experience 
could ever rationally mandate a change in the fundamental details of those views. 
Such is Gupta’s gambit. In the three sections that follow, I want to raise some worries about whether 
Gupta has adequately defended these elements of his view, and about whether these elements are enough 
to achieve his more general aims. 
IV. First Worry: Is This Empiricism? 
As I said at the outset of these comments, one of Gupta’s overarching goals is to vindicate empiricism: he   12 
wants to provide an account of epistemic justification according to which “experience is our principal 
epistemic authority and guide” and “we need heed only one epistemic master: experience” (pp. 3, 180). 
Has he succeeded in that goal? In fact, it is far from clear that he has. Gupta has certainly provided an 
account of categorical justification in which experience plays an important role. However, in order to 
vindicate empiricism we don’t just need experience to play some role in the justification of our beliefs; it 
is difficult to see how any plausible account of justification, whether rationalist or empiricist, could deny 
that. Rather, what we need is for experience to play an exclusive or primary role in the justification of our 
beliefs. And it remains to be seen whether experience bears the brunt of the normative work in Gupta’s 
proposal. In particular, we need to ask whether there are places in Gupta’s account where reason (rather 
than experience on its own) makes a substantial contribution to the justification that we have for our 
beliefs. 
  Gupta does concede that reason has a substantial role to play in at least one part of his proposal: 
he admits that “reason demarcates the views that are acceptable starting points of revision from those that 
are not” (p. 192). As Gupta sees it, it is an a priori truth, discernible through reason alone, that rigid views 
are unacceptable initial views. Presumably it is also an a priori truth, discernible through reason alone, 
that solipsist, brain-in-a-vat, and deceived-by-an-evil-demon views are rigid. These concessions grant a 
role for reason in Gupta’s account, though he seems to think that this role is rather negligible compared to 
the role played by experience. Moreover, Gupta regularly talks as if separating the admissible views from 
the inadmissible ones is the only role that reason plays on his account (see pp. 159, 175, 192). 
  However, I think that this is not entirely correct. As I will now argue, reason has at least two other 
substantial roles to play in Gupta’s account: reason demarcates the contours of the Γe(v) function, and 
reason demarcates the contours of the ρe(v) function. If I am right, then reason plays a much greater part 
in Gupta’s proposal than he admits. 
  I put forward that, for Gupta, statements about the proper extension of the Γe(v) function are 
synthetic, a priori truths, discoverable through reason alone. Here are three ways of seeing that this must 
be so:   13 
a.  Without some constraints on the extension of the Γe(v) function, we can embed any account of the 
propositional given within Gupta’s formalism. For example, let Ge be the one-argument function 
from experiences to classes of propositions put forward by the sense-datum theorist who thinks 
there  is  a  propositional  given.  Once  we  have  that  function,  we  can  construct  a  sense-datum 
version of Gupta’s two-argument function from experiences and views to classes of propositions 
by setting Γe(v) = Ge for all values of e and v. (The output of this function does not, of course, 
depend on the specific value of v that serves as input, but this function is just as much a function 
that takes both experiences and views as inputs as the arithmetical function f(x, y) = x
2 + y
0 is a 
function that takes values of both x and y as input.) Thus Gupta needs to rule out the possibility 
that the Γe(v) function has such an extension, or else it could turn out that his theory is a mere 
notational variant of the theory put forward by the sense-datum propositional givenist. How does 
he rule out such a possibility? Through an appeal to reason, presumably. (Convergence in light of 
experience is no help here, since the notion of convergence is undefined without specific values 
for the Γe(v) function.) 
b.  Gupta proposes various constraints of his own on the extension of Γe(v). For example, in the 
course of his argument  against the propositional given, he commits himself to the following 
restriction on the extension of Γe(v): 
Equivalence:  If experiences e and e′ are subjectively identical, then Γe(v) = Γe′(v). 
How do we determine whether a constraint such as Equivalence holds? Through an appeal to 
reason, presumably. (Again, convergence in light of experience is no help.) 
c.  Since it is possible for someone to hold a view which explicitly denies some of the constraints 
that Gupta proposes on the extension of Γe(v), we can’t just read off the output of Γe(v) from the 
nature of the view v that serves as input to that function. For example, there are a number of 
philosophers (such as Timothy Williamson, John McDowell, and other so-called “epistemological 
disjunctivists”)  who  hold  positions  in  the  epistemology  of  perception  that  directly  contradict   14 
Gupta’s Equivalence constraint.
15 Suppose v* is a view held by one of these philosophers who 
explicitly  denies  Equivalence;  for  example,  maybe  according  to  this  view  hallucinatory  or 
illusory  experiences  have  less  epistemic  “oomph”  than  subjectively  identical  veridical 
experiences. Even then, Gupta is committed to the claim that if e is a veridical experience and e′ 
is a subjectively identical hallucinatory experience, Γe(v*) = Γe′(v*). So it is no trivial matter how 
to determine the value of Γe(v), given a particular experience e and particular view v: the content 
of v on its own doesn’t give us a recipe for determining that value. Only through an appeal to 
reason can we fix how the output of Γe(v) depends on its inputs. 
Thus I think it is clear that reason plays a substantial role in Gupta’s account delineating the 
contours of the function Γe(v). Moreover, I claim that even once the extension of Γe(v) is fixed, this 
doesn’t fix the extension of ρe(v), so reason must also play a substantial role delineating the contours of 
the function ρe(v). Suppose that a rational being with view v undergoes experience e, and suppose that 
Q ∈ Γe(v). Gupta writes that this fact “forces the rational being to adjust its view v in light of Q (and the 
other judgments in Γe(v)). Most often this is achieved simply by adding Q to v. But sometimes it requires 
a substantial revision of the original view v to a new view v′...” (p. 81). How do we determine whether a 
substantial revision of the original view is mandated? Through an appeal to reason. 
  To see the degree to which determining the extension of ρe(v) is a substantive matter over and 
above that of determining the extension of Γe(v), notice the following: Gupta can’t hold that any old 
revision of v in light of experience e which respects the constraints imposed by the Γe(v) function is 
rationally permissible. For example, suppose I start with commonsense view vc and undergo experience 
e1. If any old revision of vc in light of experience e1 which respects the constraints imposed by the Γe(v) 
function were rationally permissible, then it would be rationally permissible for me to revise vc to the 
following view: vs  ∪ Γe1(vs),  where vs is an arbitrary solipsist view.
16  However, this result  would be 
disastrous for Gupta, for now it would always be possible after a single experience to revise one’s view to 
                                                         
15   See Williamson 2000, ch. 8; McDowell 2008; and Byrne & Logue 2008, esp. §4. 
16   If v is a view and C is a class of propositions, let v ∪ C be the view that results when the propositions in C are added to v.   15 
a solipsist view. So even if we prohibit solipsist views from being acceptable starting points for revision, 
this restriction would be rendered irrelevant, and we would be assured of never achieving convergence on 
any ordinary external-world propositions. For this reason it is absolutely essential to Gupta’s project that 
reason restricts which sorts of revisions in light of experience are rationally acceptable, even once we fix 
the extension of Γe(v). 
  Indeed, since ρe(v) is defined as “the result of rationally revising view v in light of the perceptual 
judgments Γe(v) entailed by experience e,” there is so much built into ρe(v) that a deeper worry remains. It 
might  not  just  be  the  case  that  we  (as  theorists)  need  to  make  a  substantial  appeal  to  reason  when 
discerning the appropriate output ρe(v) for a given input e and v; it might also be the case that our rational 
being needs to make a substantial appeal to reason when moving from v to ρe(v) in response to experience 
e. For example, suppose Descartes was right and there exists a sound a priori argument that God exists 
and is not a deceiver. Then every output of the ρe(v) function would include the proposition that a non-
deceiving God exists, regardless of which values of e and v serve as input, for the ideally rational way of 
revising any view v in light of any experience e would always include one’s discerning, and accepting the 
conclusion of, Descartes’ a priori argument for the existence of a non-deceiving God. In that case it 
would follow that, for any finite sequence of experiences E (even a sequence of length 1), ΩE always 
contains  the  proposition  that  a  non-deceiving  God  exists,  so  we  are  always  categorically  entitled  to 
believe that a non-deceiving God exists, but it would be extremely misleading (to say the least) to insist 
that experience is the sole epistemic master guiding us to this belief. In other words, since ρe(v) smuggles 
in changes in view that are attributable to reason as well as changes in view that are attributable to 
experience,  Gupta’s  formal  machinery  by  itself  has  no  way  of  adjudicating  whether  it  is  reason  or 
experience that does the brunt of the work in getting one to revise one’s view from v to ρe(v) when one 
has experience e. Thus even a fairly substantial commitment to rationalism is compatible with Gupta’s 
account of non-conditional justification. 
  Perhaps an  analogy will help at this point. In his oft-discussed article “Internal and  External 
Reasons,” Bernard Williams argued (in effect) that one has a reason to φ only if one could, after a process   16 
of sound deliberation from one’s existing motivations while availed of all the relevant non-normative 
facts, reach a state in which one is motivated to φ (Williams 1980). Williams took this claim to vindicate a 
sort  of  Humean  anti-rationalism  about  reasons  for  action.  In  her  response  to  Williams,  Christine 
Korsgaard argued (in effect) that if Kant’s arguments for the Categorical Imperative are sound, then 
anyone, regardless of his or her present motivations, could reach through sound deliberation a state in 
which he or she is motivated to act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, so Williams’ account 
of reasons is compatible with the most thoroughgoing sort of rationalism about reasons for action that is 
possible  (Korsgaard  1986).  I  mean  to  be  making  the  same  sort  of  point  about  Gupta’s  account  of 
categorical entitlements. Just as, if there is such a thing as pure practical reason, then it is compatible with 
Williams’ proposal that pure reason on its own could secure substantive truths about what we have reason 
to do, so too, I claim, if there is such a thing as pure theoretical reason, then it is compatible with Gupta’s 
proposal that pure reason on its own could secure substantive truths about what we have (non-conditional) 
reason to believe. 
  Now Williams’ reply to Korsgaard was to concede her point, but then to insist that it comes to 
naught since Kant’s arguments for the Categorical Imperative are unsound.
17 So too, I imagine, Gupta 
might  concede  the  point  I  am  making  here,  but  then  insist  that  it  comes  to  naught  since  Descartes’ 
arguments  for  the  existence  of  a  non-deceiving  God—as  well  as  all  other  rationalist  arguments  for 
substantive truths about the nature of the self or the world—are unsound (see pp. 10, 162-163, 216). 
However, the more general point I want to make would still hold, for it would then be these negative 
arguments against the soundness of the rationalist arguments that would be doing the work in vindicating 
empiricism,  not  Gupta’s  positive  arguments  for  his  general  framework.  That  general  framework  is 
entirely compatible with reason carrying more of the normative load than experience in getting one’s 
views to converge on a given proposition, since the ρe(v) function encompasses both rational revisions of 
one’s  view  that  are  grounded  in  reason  and  rational  revisions  of  one’s  view  that  are  grounded  in 
experience. 
                                                         
17   See Williams 1989, p. 44, n. 3, and 2001, pp. 93-94.   17 
  When emphasizing the empiricist nature of his project, Gupta makes a positive point about the 
role of experience in his proposal and a negative point about the role of reason: he claims that according 
to his proposal “experience is the supreme epistemic authority” (p. 213; repeated on p. 220, n. 3), and he 
claims that according to his proposal “reason has no special insight into the nature of reality” (p. 175). I 
have just argued that both of these claims are not entirely accurate. Since reason passes verdict on the 
admissibility of views and delineates the contours of the Γe(v) and ρe(v) functions, experience is not the 
only  epistemic  authority  in  Gupta’s  account.  And  since  the  Γe(v)  and  ρe(v)  functions  encapsulate 
epistemic truths, I think there is no denying that, for Gupta, reason has special insight into nature of 
epistemic reality, at the very least. Moreover, depending on whether reason makes a greater contribution 
than experience in determining the output of ρe(v) for some values of e and v (an issue on which, I have 
argued, Gupta’s formal machinery is by itself silent), it might even turn out, on Gupta’s proposal, that 
reason does have special insight into the nature of non-epistemic reality, and that reason is as supreme an 
epistemic authority on some matters as experience is on others.
18 
V. Second Worry: Do We Really Get Categorical Entitlements? 
So far I have not presented any actual objections to Gupta’s proposal, but rather have just been voicing 
some concerns about the way in which it is advertised. Now, however, it is time to dig a little deeper and 
raise some worries about the details of Gupta’s account, for I think there is a serious lacuna in Gupta’s 
explanation of how hypothetical perceptual entitlements can together give rise to categorical entitlements. 
According to Gupta,  we have an  absolute entitlement to believe the common core of the admissible 
outcomes generated by the sequence of experiences we have actually undergone. However, it is far from 
clear that Gupta has provided us with enough material to account for why this might be so. Let me 
explain. 
                                                         
18   In  particular,  I  have  serious  doubts  that  experience  on  its  own  is  enough  to  achieve  convergence  with  regards  to 
mathematical claims, logical claims, moral and other normative claims, and meta-philosophical claims. Gupta sets aside these 
cases when laying out his framework in Empiricism and Experience (see, for example, p. 4, n. 1, where he says that he will not be 
considering our knowledge of mathematics), but a full-blown defense of empiricism would of course require extending that 
framework to  these other cases, which  are precisely the sorts of cases that have proven  the  most resistant to  an empiricist 
treatment over the centuries.   18 
  Suppose there are only m acceptable starting views: s1, s2, s3, ... sm.
19 Moreover, suppose that for a 
given  finite  sequence  of  experiences  E  =  <e1, e2, e3, ... en>  and  for  a  given  proposition  P,  P ∈ ΩE. 
According  to  Gupta,  it  follows  that  any  rational  being  who  has  had  sequence  of  experiences  E  is 
absolutely entitled to believe P. But does this really follow? From the definition of ΩE, we know that 
P ∈ ρE(s1), P ∈ ρE(s2), P ∈ ρE(s3), ... and P ∈ ρE(sm). Given Gupta’s account of the hypothetical given, this 
means that the following raft of conditionals holds: 
If S was entitled to hold s1 before having experience e1, then S is now entitled to believe P after 
having sequence of experiences E = <e1, e2, e3, ... en>. 
If S was entitled to hold s2 before having experience e1, then S is now entitled to believe P after 
having sequence of experiences E. 
... 
If S was entitled to hold sm before having experience e1, then S is now entitled to believe P after 
having sequence of experiences E. 
But Gupta’s desire conclusion, namely “S is now entitled to believe P,” only follows from this set of 
conditionals if we make the following additional assumption: 
(*)  Before having experience e1, S was (absolutely) entitled to hold at least one admissible 
view. 
However, what explains why (*) is true? More conditional entitlements? Or something of a different sort? 
  Just  how  pressing  this  problem  is  can  be  seen  once  we  realize  the  following:  on  Gupta’s 
conception of the given, entitlements flow (as it were) from input views to output views when one has an 
experience. Thus if one has a sequence of experiences, entitlements can gush from one view to the next, 
but only if one is entitled to the first ur-view from whence all these entitlements flow. Moreover, this 
initial entitlement must be a categorical entitlement. So I fail to see how hypothetical entitlements, on 
their own, can yield categorical entitlements, even when convergence occurs. We still need there to be 
categorical entitlements standing at the head of the revision process, and it is just not clear what sort of 
account could be provided of those initial categorical entitlements with the materials Gupta has provided 
us. Gupta himself writes at one point that “the move from [a] conditional entitlement to a categorical 
                                                         
19   Presumably  there  will  always  be  a  non-denumerably  infinite  number  of  acceptable  starting  views,  but  for  ease  of 
exposition it will be harmless to engage in the fiction that the number of admissible views is finite.   19 
entitlement requires a prior entitlement to my view” (p. 76), and the prior entitlement in question is 
clearly a prior categorical entitlement, not a hypothetical one. So in order to get categorical entitlements 
out, we need to put categorical entitlements in; but Gupta has not explained how we can put categorical 
entitlements in, so he has not explained how we can get categorical entitlements out. 
  During Gupta’s official presentation of how hypothetical entitlements can give rise to categorical 
entitlements, Gupta has us imagine that our rational being is what he calls a “raimex”: an ideal rational, 
imaginative, and experiencing being (p. 95). He also has us imagine that, when convergence occurs, the 
raimex has realized that convergence has occurred: the raimex has considered every acceptable starting 
view and come to the conclusion that each way of rationally developing one of those views in light of the 
experiences that it has had results in a view that overlaps on a given proposition, say P (pp. 95-101). This 
makes it extremely tempting to think that the raimex is non-conditionally justified in believing P because 
it can run through the following story in its head: “If I had started by accepting s1, then right now I would 
be entitled to believe P; if I had started by accepting s2, then right now I would be entitled to believe P; ... 
and if I had started by accepting sm, then right now I would be entitled to believe P. So no matter which 
admissible view I had started by accepting, I would right now be entitled to believe P. Therefore I am 
entitled to believe P.” 
However, this sort of reasoning conflates the two different formulations of the hypothetical given 
that  I  mentioned  in  §II.  According  to  the  incorrect  (but  tempting)  interpretation  of  Gupta  on  the 
hypothetical given, if subject S has experience e and holds view v, then S is entitled to believe each of the 
propositions in Γe(v). According to what I believe is the correct interpretation, if subject S has experience 
e and is entitled to hold view v, then S is entitled to believe each of the propositions in Γe(v). So really the 
raimex should be saying to itself the following: “If I had started by being entitled to accept s1, then right 
now I would be entitled to believe P; if I had started by being entitled to accept s2, then right now I would 
be entitled to believe P; ... and if I had started by being entitled to accept sm, then right now I would be 
entitled to believe P.” Moreover, there is no way for the raimex to get from this piece of reasoning to the 
conclusion  “I  am  entitled  to  believe  P”  without  invoking  additional  assumptions  about  its  being   20 
categorically entitled to hold at least one of the initial views. So Gupta’s conceit of having us imagine a 
raimex  who  runs  through  the  revision  process  in  its  head  is  no  help  in  explaining  how  categorical 
entitlements can arise from hypothetical ones.
20 
VI. Third Worry: Does Convergence Ever Occur? 
I have just argued that Gupta has not actually provided us with the resources to explain why we are 
categorically  entitled  to  believe  the  propositions  in  the  common  core  of  the  admissible  outcomes 
generated by a given finite sequence of experiences. Let us now pass over this problem and ask another 
question: will there in fact be any propositions in the common core of the admissible outcomes generated 
by the ordinary sequences of experiences that most of us have had? That is, does convergence actually 
occur for us? Are we absolutely entitled to believe anything, on Gupta’s proposal? 
  The most pressing threat to convergence is that presented by solipsist views and by skeptical 
scenarios involving brains-in-vats, evil demons, and the like. Gupta’s move of deeming solipsist, brain-in-
a-vat, and deceived-by-an-evil-demon views to be unacceptable starting points for revision because they 
                                                         
20   In the body of this paper I have put forward an interpretation of Gupta’s account of the hypothetical given according to 
which  entitlements  to  views  plus  experiences  yield  entitlements  to  perceptual  judgments,  both  because  I  think  this  is  the 
interpretation that best fits his text (see n. 8), and because it is a natural way of understanding Gupta’s claim on pp. 80-82 that the 
epistemology of the given in experience is analogous to the epistemology of valid argument schemata such as modus ponens, 
given the (not unheard of) assumption that the epistemology of valid argument schemata works as follows: if one is entitled to 
believe the premises, then one is entitled to believe the conclusion. However, since the epistemology of valid argument schemata 
is a controversial matter, Gupta could attempt to resist my argument in this section by endorsing a different epistemology of valid 
argument schemata, and by extension a different account of the hypothetical given. 
   For  example,  one  currently  popular  account  takes  the  rational  relation  between  premises  and  conclusion  in  a  valid 
argument schemata to take the form of a wide-scope requirement, such as 
wide-scope logical requirement:  S is rationally required (if she believes the premises, to believe the conclusion). 
(On the wide-scoping program, see Broome 1999 and the references contained in Schroeder 2004.) An analogous interpretation 
of the hypothetical given would be as follows: 
wide-scope hypothetical given:  S is rationally required (if she has experience e and holds view v, to believe Γe(v)). 
Moving to a wide-scope version of the hypothetical given frees us from a model whereby justification flows from inputs to 
outputs, so the problem I have been discussing in this section disappears. However, two new problems appear: first, since it is 
always possible to obey the proposed wide-scope requirement by suspending judgment on (the relevant parts of) the view in the 
antecedent, we now need a story about why it is irrational to suspend judgment in order to explain why convergence yields 
categorical  requirements on belief, and second, since it is always possible to obey the proposed wide-scope requirement by 
shifting to a radically different set of beliefs, we now need to argue that it is never rational to hold a solipsist or brain-in-a-vat 
view, not just that it is unacceptable to start by holding such a view, or else convergence on ordinary external-world propositions 
will never occur. 
     Thus I believe that the problem I identify for Gupta in this section really takes the form of a dilemma: if he endorses a 
model for the hypothetical given whereby entitlements transmit from antecedently held views to newly held perceptual judgments 
when  one  has  a  given  experience,  then  my  argument  from  the  body  of  the  paper  applies;  whereas  if  he  endorses  a  non-
transmission  model  for  the  hypothetical  given  (such  as  that  provided  by  the  wide-scope  interpretation),  then  he  loses  the 
resources to explain why we can’t move to a solipsist view (or suspend judgment) after a single experience.   21 
possess  the  dynamical  property  of  being  rigid  is  an  artful  attempt  to  dodge  these  skeptical  worries. 
However, skepticism is a many-headed hydra: often one lops off one head, only to find that two more 
grow back in its place. And that is just what happens here, for even if Gupta’s strategy succeeds in 
defusing the threat posed by standard versions of the solipsist, brain-in-a-vat, and deceived-by-an-evil-
demon views, there are variants of those views that escape Gupta’s strategy.  
  For example, consider the following two types of views: 
a no-writing-in-the-sky solipsist view = a view according to which all that exists is the subject’s 
mind and its sense-data, unless the subject has an experience as of the stars in the sky 
realigning themselves to read, “You are a flesh-and-blood creature living in an external 
world created by the one true God,” in which case a commonsense, religious view of the 
world is true;
21 
a no-scent-of-lavender brain-in-a-vat view = a view according to which the subject is a solitary 
brain-in-a-vat being fed illusory experiences, unless the subject has an experience as of 
smelling lavender, in which case the commonsense view of the world is true (since the 
brain-in-a-vat technology is unable to simulate the smell of lavender). 
Both of these views are indisputably non-rigid: there are possible courses of experience which would 
entitle a rational being who holds one of these views to fundamentally alter her basic account of the self 
and the world. So these sorts of views cannot be ruled inadmissible on the grounds that they are not rigid. 
Moreover,  if  these  views  are  deemed  admissible,  then  they  will  ensure  that  convergence  on  a 
commonsense view of the world does not occur for those subjects who never experience the smell of 
lavender or never seem to see the stars form words in the sky. 
  Of course, these views might be deemed inadmissible on grounds not having to do with rigidity: 
Gupta only insists that non-rigidity is a necessary condition for admissibility, not that it is a sufficient one 
(p. 155). So we might look for a different restriction on acceptable starting views that would rule out no-
writing-in-the-sky solipsist views and no-scent-of-lavender brain-in-a-vat views. But  what  would this 
restriction  be?  I  have  a  difficult  time  thinking  of  a  well-motivated,  non-ad-hoc  proposal  that  would 
exclude these sorts of views. Moreover, there is a worry that even if we could somehow come up with a  
new  restriction  on  acceptable  starting  views  that  precludes  these  versions  of  the  original  skeptical 
                                                         
21   This example is a variant of one proposed by Ned Hall during the question session of a talk by Gupta at Harvard in the 
spring of 2006. After the bulk of these comments were written, I discovered that Ram Neta makes a very similar point about a 
very similar example in Neta 2009.   22 
scenarios,  it  will  be  possible  to  think  up  another  version  of  those  scenarios  which  avoids  the  new 
restriction as well. 
  In fact, matters are even worse than that. It’s not just that there are diabolical variants of the 
solipsist, brain-in-a-vat, and deceived-by-an-evil-demon views which can evade Gupta’s requirement that 
admissible views be non-rigid. I think a little reflection shows that, despite Gupta’s claims to the contrary, 
even the usual versions of the solipsist, brain-in-a-vat, and deceived-by-an-evil-demon views are not 
rigid. So Gupta’s requirement that admissible views be non-rigid doesn’t even solve our original problem, 
since it doesn’t exclude the sorts of views it was specifically designed to rule out. 
Recall that a view v counts as being rigid if and only if, for every finite sequence of experiences 
E, ρE(v) is fundamentally equivalent to v—that is, if and only if the result of revising v in light of a given 
finite sequence of experiences always results in a view with the same basic account of the self and the 
world as v. Thus in order to assess whether solipsist, brain-in-a-vat, and deceived-by-an-evil-demon views 
are rigid, we need to ask whether there are any courses of experience which would rationally require a 
revision of the basic account of the self and the world found in any one of these views. Now I believe that 
I have already, in effect, provided such an example: I believe that if one holds a standard solipsist view, 
and one has a sufficient number of experiences as of the stars in the sky rearranging themselves to tell one 
various things, then it might be rational to give up one’s solipsism and accept a different view of the 
world and the self. However, this sort of example depends on some controversial assumptions about the 
degree to which (seemingly) testimonial evidence can override the justification that one has for one’s 
current view, so let me now present a series of examples that don’t make any such assumptions. 
  It is easy enough to imagine a sequence of experiences that would rationally mandate moving 
from the first of the following two views to the second: 
a four-senses solipsist view = a view according to which all that exists is the subject’s mind and 
its sense-data, which fall into four basic types: visual, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory; 
a five-senses solipsist view = a view according to which all that exists is the subject’s mind and its 
sense-data,  which  fall  into  five  basic  types:  visual,  tactile,  olfactory,  gustatory,  and 
auditory. 
Perhaps if a rational being had the experience as of all sorts of unfortunate, improbable, and intensely   23 
painful events occurring in rapid succession, it might be rational for her to move from the first of the 
following two views to the second: 
a deceived-by-a-somewhat-evil-demon view = a view according to which the subject is being fed 
illusory  experiences  by  a  demon  whose  only  evil  trait  is  his  penchant  for  deceiving 
people; 
a deceived-by-a-very-very-evil-demon view = a view according to which the subject is being fed 
illusory  experiences  by  an  utterly  malevolent  demon  who  not  only  enjoys  deceiving 
people,  but  also  does  his  best  to  subject  them  to  the  most  painful  and  unpleasant 
experiences possible.  
Finally, and most controversially, perhaps if a rational being has an experience as of having all sorts of 
enlightening, amusing, and surprising conversations with other seemingly intelligent beings, then it would 
be rational for her to move from the first of the following two views to the second:  
a solipsistic brain-in-a-vat view = a view according to which the subject is a solitary brain-in-a-
vat being fed illusory experiences by an evil scientist; 
a collective brain-in-a-vat view = a view according to which the subject and a number of other 
conscious  beings  are  brains-in-vats  being  fed  parallel  illusory  experiences  by  an  evil 
scientist, so that they all inhabit the same illusory world of mere appearances. 
In each of these cases, I claim that the change in view elicited by experience yields a change in one’s 
basic account of the self or the world. In the move from a four-senses to a five-senses solipsist view, I 
claim that one’s fundamental picture of the self has altered, for now one holds that one is able to detect a 
whole new type of sense-datum. In the move from a deceived-by-a-somewhat-evil- to a deceived-by-a-
very-very-evil-demon view, I claim that one’s fundamental picture of the world has altered, for now one 
holds  that  the  external  force  responsible  for  one’s  illusory  experiences  has  a  very  different  intrinsic 
nature.  And  in  the  move  from  a  solipsistic  to  a  collective  brain-in-a-vat  view,  I  claim  that  one’s 
fundamental picture of both the world and the self has altered, for now one holds that the world in which 
one finds oneself contains other conscious beings who have the same basic nature as oneself (and thus 
one no longer thinks of oneself as fundamentally unique).
22 But if all of this is correct, then it is possible 
                                                         
22   Perhaps there is room to quibble about these claims I have just made: maybe, for example, a world in which one is 
deceived by a somewhat evil demon counts as the-same-in-fundamental-respects as a world in which one is deceived by a very, 
very evil demon, or maybe a world inhabited by a solipsistic brain-in-a-vat is not fundamentally different from a world inhabited 
by a group of collective brains-in-vats. However: (i) now I am starting to lose track of what makes one account of the world or 
the self fundamentally the same as another (after all, these changes in view seem as fundamental as Gupta’s standard example of 
a fundamental change in view, namely a shift from a flat-Earth to a spherical-Earth view [see pp. 90, 161]); and (ii) as this sort of   24 
for one to hold a standard version of a solipsist, deceived-by-an-evil-demon, or brain-in-a-vat view and 
for the rational pressure of experience to force one to fundamentally revise one’s basic account of the self 
or the world. Conclusion: even the standard versions of those views are not rigid. 
  Gupta might reply that even if these examples show that it can be rational to move from one 
variety of solipsist view to another (fundamentally inequivalent) variety of solipsist view, none of these 
examples show that it can be rational to move from a solipsist to a non-solipsist view, or from a brain-in-
a-vat view to a non-brain-in-a-vat view, or from a deceived-by-an-evil-demon to a non-deceived-by-an-
evil-demon view. Thus it is open to Gupta to concede that the examples I have produced demonstrate that 
solipsist, brain-in-a-vat views, and deceived-by-an-evil-demon do not possess the property of being rigid 
as he originally defined it, but then to attempt to define that property in some other way. Two proposals 
readily  suggest  themselves:  according  to  the  first,  a  view  counts  as  rigid  if  and  only  if  the  rational 
pressure of experience  can never force one to revise certain portions of that view; according to the 
second, a view counts as rigid if and only if it belongs to a class of views such that the rational pressure of 
experience can never force one to revise one’s view to one that is not fundamentally equivalent to any 
view in that class. Then if it is not possible for the rational pressure of experience to compel someone who 
holds a solipsist view to give up her belief that her mind and its sense-data is all that exists, or if it is not 
possible for the rational pressure of experience to require someone who holds a solipsist view to shift to a 
non-solipsist view,  Gupta could rehabilitate his claim that solipsist views are rigid, and similarly for 
brain-in-a-vat and deceived-by-an-evil-demon views. However, both of these proposals face the same 
problem: they both deem almost all commonsense views to be rigid as well, since surely there are at least 
some aspects of most commonsense views that are immune to pressure from experience (for example, 
consider mathematical and logical beliefs),
23 and since surely any commonsense view is a member of 
some class of views which it is not possible to be rationally forced out of (for example, consider the class 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
response is pressed further and further, there is a worry that any change in our commonsense view in response to experience will 
now no longer count as a fundamental change, so that the rigidity of solipsistic, brain-in-a-vat, and deceived-by-an-evil-demon 
views will be preserved only by making commonsense views rigid as well. 
23   Diehard Quineans might insist that mathematical and logical beliefs are revisable in light of experience, but even they 
must concede that the epistemic rules by which we revise our web belief avoid the tribunal of experience, since those rules 
constitute what it is for us to face the tribunal of experience.   25 
of all views, or the class of all but a few outlier views). Of course, it might be possible to further refine 
these redefinitions of rigidity to avoid throwing out the commonsense baby with the skeptical bathwater, 
but I have a difficult time thinking of a well-motivated, non-ad-hoc way of doing so. 
Thus in the end I think that Gupta’s strategy of deeming rigid views to be unacceptable starting 
points for revision does not fully address the problem presented by solipsist, brain-in-a-vat, and deceived-
by-an-evil-demon  views.  Not  only  are  there  variants  of  these  views  which  are  clearly  responsive  to 
experience and hence clearly non-rigid, but it is likely that even the standard versions of those views are 
not rigid, if we go by the letter of how Gupta defines rigidity. Now nothing I have said here definitively 
rules out the possibility that there might be a better way of defining rigidity, or that there might be a 
plausible additional restriction on the admissibility of views beyond the requirement that they be non-
rigid. However, once we see the kinds of resources that the skeptic has available to her, I think we should 
be highly doubtful that Gupta’s strategy of ruling out troublesome views as initial starting points because 
of their dynamical properties is up to the task at hand. For this reason, I suspect that convergence on 
ordinary  external-world  propositions  will  almost  never  occur  within  Gupta’s  framework,  and  thus 
skepticism will be just as inevitable a consequence of Gupta’s brand of empiricism as it is for the classical 
versions of empiricism upon which he is seeking to improve. 
  I have just mentioned one reason to be suspicious that convergence on all but the most trivial of 
propositions (such as that I exist) could occur within Gupta’s system. I now want to close these comments 
by briefly mentioning a very different reason to doubt that convergence on non-trivial propositions is 
possible. Most often in Empiricism and Experience when Gupta discusses the normative properties of 
beliefs,  he  talks  of  the  subject  being  entitled  to  believe  a  given  proposition,  or  of  belief  in  a  given 
proposition being rational or being justified for that subject. Occasionally, though, Gupta takes these 
claims to be equivalent to the claim that the subject is rationally required or rationally obligated to 
believe the proposition in question (see, for instance, pp. 85, 87, 95, 98-103, 215). However, this is a 
mistake: entitlements as we ordinarily think of them are permissions, not obligations. If you are entitled 
to  use  my  office  while  I  am  away  on  sabbatical,  then  you  are  permitted  to  do  so,  but  it  would  be   26 
extremely bizarre to think that you are obligated to use it. So within the realm of practical normativity, 
entitlements are permissions, not obligations. Now it might be that in the realm of theoretical normativity, 
there is no deontic category of the merely permissible, so all epistemic entitlements are both permissions 
and obligations, but this is a substantive (and, I might add, counterintuitive) thesis that must be argued 
for.
24 Moreover, once it is realized that the default position is to take entitlements to be permissions, not 
obligations, I think that any hope of convergence on a single view when revising in light of experience all 
but dissipates. 
  I put forward that I am rationally permitted but not rationally required to believe every logical 
consequence of the set of propositions that I currently (rationally) believe. (It’s one thing to convict me of 
a rational failing because my beliefs are contradictory, but quite another thing to convict me of a rational 
failing because I haven’t bothered to take a stand on some extremely abstruse consequence of one of my 
more obscure beliefs.) Similarly, I put forward that I am rationally permitted but not rationally required 
to believe every “perceptual consequence” of the experience that I am currently having. Indeed, this is the 
most natural  way of interpreting  Gupta’s account of the hypothetical given: when  Gupta says that a 
rational being who is entitled to view v and has experience e is entitled to believe each proposition in 
Γe(v), it is natural to take this to mean that the rational being is rationally permitted to believe each of 
those propositions, not that she is rationally required. 
However, now we have trouble, since for just about any view v and experience e, the class Γe(v) 
of “perceptual consequences” of v and e will presumably contain a non-denumerably infinite number of 
propositions. However, this means that our assumption (following Gupta) that there will always be a 
unique way ρe(v) of rationally revising a given view v in light of a given experience e will be massively 
mistaken, not because there might sometimes be two or three rationally permissible ways of revising a 
given  view  in  light  of  a  given  experience,  but  rather  because  there  will  almost  always  be  a  non-
denumerably infinite number of rationally permissible ways of revising a given view in light of a given 
experience. But then at almost every stage of Gupta’s revision process there will be a non-denumerably 
                                                         
24   On the general issue of how much permissiveness is acceptable within one’s epistemology, see White 2005.   27 
infinite number of nodes that branch out from each view that has survived up to that stage of revision. 
Now maybe all of these infinitely branching nodes will eventually converge on a single view; however, 
that possibility strikes me as incredibly unlikely. So the observation that entitlements are permissions, not 
obligations, gives us additional reason to be suspicious of Gupta’s claim that our ordinary course of 
experience can rationally force us to converge on our commonsense view of the world.
25 
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